Since 1968 Indonesia has had a high rate of growth, facilitated considerably by the high oil prices in the 1970s and early 1980s. As an oil exporter, Indonesia experienced two major booms: 1974-77 and 1979-82 . Under the clear recognition that oil revenues were a temporary blessing, Indonesia's overall policy was directed toward using the revenues to stimulate investment so as to assure sustained growth after the oil became depleted. A central goal of government policy was to foster growth in the manufacturing sector by channeling money to the private industrial sector through the banking system. During the boom periods the banks were instructed to finance at low interest rates certain types of investment, particularly in import substitution and backward integration of heavy industries.
Following sharp declines in oil revenues in late 1982 and again in 1986, policymakers recognized the need for major reforms. First, non-oil exports had to be increased to maintain the flow of imports essential for continued development. Second, with the decline in oil revenues, fewer resources were available to the public sector, and therefore it became necessary to stimulate private savings
Tnibilzation. An integral part of the policy reform was deregulating the banking system in June 1983. The deregulation allowed banks to set interest rates, substantially reduced central bank liquidity credits, and abolished administratively determined credit ceilings. The general objective was to move away from administrative control to market allocation of credit flows.
In 1986, when oil prices fell further, the government was again forced to devalue the currency, and further deregulation measures were taken. The continuing evolution of policy toward increased market orientation reached its peak in 1988 in a series of major policy reforms affecting primarily the banking, capital markets, trade, and tax systems. The reforms have had a significant impact on the real sector.
This article assesses the effects of the reforms, in particular the financial reforms, on the structure and behavior of manufacturing industries in Indonesia. How did credit allocation change with financial deregulation? What was the impact on firms' investment choices? Did the effects of reform differ across firms? To answer these questions, we use data from a panel of manufacturing establishments in Indonesia during 1981-88.
Section I contains a macroeconomic overview. Section II discusses the structure of manufacturing industries and the determinants of access to credit markets. Section III describes the economic and financial evolution of establishments during the 1980s. Section IV presents econometric evidence on the effects of financial liberalization on investment behavior. The conclusion summarizes the main findings.
I. MACROECONOMIC AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA
This section provides a review of the macroeconomy during 1973-88 and of the effects of the 1983 deregulation of the banking sector.
The Macroeconomic Background
From 1973 through 1982, Indonesia enjoyed prosperity fueled by high oil prices. Macroeconomic policy was fairly sound, and was concerned with keeping inflation under control and maintaining a prudent fiscal policy. A cautious policy toward foreign borrowing kept the country's debt service ratio fairly low throughout the boom period. But the government was less successful in controlling inflation, because of its inability to sterilize oil revenues. By the end of 1982 the economy was overheated, with high levels of oil-related public investments and an upsurge in private investments accompanied by protectionist and interventionist policies.
Falling oil prices in 1983, together with the worldwide recession and an increase in the U.S. real interest rate, worsened Indonesia's balance of payments, thereby impairing its ability to service debt. The government responded by devaluing the rupiah by 50 percent at the end of March 1983, primarily to boost non-oil exports. Following this large discrete devaluation, the foreign exchange regime was changed to a crawling peg system. To reduce both external and internal imbalances, a series of austerity measures was introduced, and the government moved quickly to mobilize domestic resources through reforms in the financial sector and improved collection of non-oil tax revenues (see Chant and Pangestu 1992) .
Before June 1, 1983, Indonesia had most of the characteristics of a financially repressed system. The banking sector was heavily regulated, and entry was very restricted. The market was dominated by state banks, with Bank Indonesia alone accounting for 35 percent of the total assets of the financial system and the five large state banks holding another 40 percent. Bank Indonesia set ceilings on bank credits for individual banks, and this was the principal way to control monetary expansion. It was believed that reserve management alone was insufficient, given the volatility of international financial flows, including oil revenues, and given the absence of restrictions on private capital movements. Over time an extensive selective credit system with subsidized interest rates was introduced. Moreover, Bank Indonesia provided direct lending to some economic units and channeled substantial amounts of low-interest liquidity credits to high-priority or strategic sectors. These were the tools for channeling oil earnings to the private and parastatal sectors to increase investment. When the volume of oil revenues fell precipitously, the principal task facing the financial sector changed quickly to the mobilization of domestic resources.
Indonesia's trade and industrial policies were basically protectionist and were primarily implemented through a detailed licensing system. Together with the trade and industrial policies, the cheap-credit policy helped to create a few dominant economic groups or conglomerates, which prospered because of their ability to make use of the administrative allocation systems (Robison 1986 ). Efforts to increase the mobilization of domestic funds through the financial sector and to improve the collection of non-oil tax revenues were reflected in significant reforms in the 1983 banking deregulation and in the tax reforms of 1984. The principal objectives of the banking deregulation were to provide higher returns to depositors and lower costs to borrowers by raising the degree of competition in the financial markets, to increase savings mobilization through the banking system, to allocate financial resources more efficiently through increased reliance on the market mechanism, and to increase the use of capital market instruments to raise equity capital and enhance the liquidity of shares.
The measures taken included abolishing credit ceilings, reducing liquidity credits, and granting permission for state banks to set their own interest rates on deposits and loans. Each of these measures required drastic changes in the behavior of banks and in the techniques of liquidity management. All banks were subjected to much greater competition and became responsible for acting on their independent assessments of profitable opportunities. The immediate effects of the 1983 banking reforms were to substantially increase interest rates paid on deposits and charged for loans and to increase the share of gross domestic product (GDP) being channeled through the formal financial system. The anticipated changes in competitive behavior emerged only slowly and were really given impetus with the reforms in 1988 and 1989. The fall in oil prices from $28 a barrel to $9 a barrel by August 1986 forced the government to carry out a maxi devaluation of the currency-by 45 percent, in September 1986-to improve the country's balance of payments. The plummeting oil and primary commodity prices shocked the government and induced it to accelerate the introduction of reforms designed to stimulate non-oil exports. This article concentrates on the changes that occurred in the mid-1980s. We refer to 1981-84 as a "preliberalization" or "prereform" period, under the assumption that changes instituted late in 1983 did not affect financial and investment decisions until well into 1984. We refer to 1985-88 as a "postliberalization" or "postreform" period. This pre-post dichotimization suggests a onceand-for-all shift in regime that considerably exaggerates the reality. Rather, there was a fairly continuous process of liberalization of various aspects of the economy after mid-1983. Furthermore, the response of economic agents to these reforms occurred fairly gradually. Nevertheless, for our purposes, the 1983 reforms were extremely significant for increasing the levels of real interest rates and reducing the credit controls placed on individual banks. The dominant state banks were forced to act more autonomously and to base their lending decisions more on commercial criteria than had been the case before the reforms.
Effects of the 1983 Banking Deregulation
Following the 1983 banking deregulation, interest rates on deposits at the state banks almost doubled. For example, the average interest rate on six-month time deposits at state banks rose from 6 percent a year in March 1983 to 11.5 percent a year one month later. At the same time, private banks increased their deposit rate from 18.3 percent to 20.0 percent. Consequently, the banking industry had to adjust its lending rates to remain profitable in a competitive market. As a result of the increasing share of short-term fixed-rate liabilities, the banks became more cautious in their credit policies. It was widely believed that the high cost of intermediation and the high credit risk of the financial system caused an unusually large spread between lending and deposit rates.
In assessing the effects of the reforms in the 1983 banking deregulation, it is critical to remember that, in response to higher interest rates, there was a shift toward financial intermediation in the Indonesian economy. Table 1 shows the expansion of bank-intermediated credit rising from 17 percent of GDP in 1980 to 38 percent in 1989, mirroring the mobilization of resources through interest-bearing deposits. Table 1 also shows that the share of credit extended to manufacturing increased during this period, further reinforcing the quantity effects of the reforms. Thus the basic pattern in Indonesia following the reforms was a vast increase in the supply of bank credit at substantially higher real interest rates.
The other aspect of the reforms shown in table 1 is the changing structure of the banking industry and the channels through which credit was extended. Bank Indonesia sharply reduced its direct role in lending, part of which was replaced by lending through state commercial banks. Over time the role of private banks became important, their share of lending rising from 9 percent in 1980 to 29 percent in 1989. a. LIBOR (London interbank offered rate) was chosen because it was extensively used as a benchmark in most foreign loan agreements.
b. 6 is the ex post exchange rate depreciation at the end of the calendar year and was chosen because the forward exchange rate market did not exist in Indonesia.
Source: Bank Indonesia (various issues-a, various issues-b); International Monetary Fund (various issues). Table 2 displays the increase in nominal and real interest rates following deregulation. The average nominal lending rate increased from about 9 percent in 1981 to about 22.5 percent in 1988. The associated real lending rate increased from -0.46 in 1981 to 10.97 by the end of 1988. The abrupt increases in the real rate in 1984 and 1985 were caused by the deregulation-induced jump in nominal interest rates, whereas inflation had been stabilized at rates well below 10 percent. Deposit rates showed exactly the same movement, whereas nominal spreads between 90-day deposit rates and prime commercial lending rates remained close to 5 percent. Table 2 also presents data on the effective cost of foreign loans to Indonesian borrowers. Comparing these figures with the nominal lending rate on rupiahdenominated credit, it is clear that before 1984 Indonesian interest rates remained far below lending rates in Singapore and Hong Kong. This made Indonesian credit a bargain for those borrowers granted access to loans. Of course, Bank Indonesia had to control the levels of lending, because there must have been substantial excess demand. Without controls, one would expect interest rate parity to apply between Indonesian and offshore borrowing costs, because competition for credit would have driven rates up until they were appropriately in line with foreign rates. At the same time, competition among banks for deposits in response to higher lending rates should also have driven deposit rates up to parity with foreign rates. '
1. The interest rate parity condition that should apply between any two countries between which capital is perfectly mobile can be written, assuming perfect foresight, as i = i_ + 6, where i is the effective cost in rupiah of borrowing in dollars, i., is the nominal foreign interest rate, and a is the rate of depreciation of the rupiah-dollar exchange rate. This equation merely states that the effective lending rate will be the same regardless of the currency in which the loan is contracted.
It remains a puzzle how Indonesian banks were able to maintain deposit rates that were so much lower than foreign rates before 1984. There were no controls on capital flows, and Indonesians could hold deposits in either dollar-or rupiahdenominated accounts in local banks. Although domestic deposits held in foreign banks must have been substantial, we have no systematic record of the levels. The enormous deposit holding in response to higher interest rates suggests that considerable substitution between dollar-and rupiah-denominated accounts occurred. However, it remains clear that rupiah-and dollar-denominated deposits are imperfect substitutes. The point is reinforced by the positive differential in interest rates adjusted for devaluation after the deregulation.
In response to the 1983 reforms, Indonesian nominal interest rates rose while international nominal rates declined. In fact, the adjustment "overshot," in that Indonesian deposit and lending rates were higher than the levels that would have been dictated by interest rate parity. By 1988, adjusted foreign-borrowing rates were considerably lower than in Indonesia, and this trend accelerated after 1989.
With the average interest on rupiah loans nearly 22 percent a year after 1984, established Indonesian firms could borrow at the Singapore or London interbank offered rate (SIBOR or LIBOR, respectively) plus a 0.5 to 2.0 percent risk premium, which resulted in nominal loan rates ranging between 7.5 and 10 percent. With a foreign exchange swap facility available at premiums of between 4.5 and 6 percent, the implied rupiah interest rate on foreign loans was between 12 and 16 percent. As far as exporters were concerned, borrowing offshore was a source of cheaper funds, even without the swap facility, because their dollardenominated export revenue could protect them from exchange rate risk.
Thus deregulation substantially increased the returns to holding rupiahdenominated deposits and, at the same time, increased the advantages obtainable by firms with access to offshore borrowing. These results have raised a hotly debated issue in Indonesia: whether the reforms that have increased interest rates have served to help or to hinder smaller and nonconglomerate firms, which have less access to "cheap" offshore borrowing.
II. INDONESIA'S MANUFACTURING FIRMS AND THEIR ACCESS
TO CREDIT MARKETS Indonesian manufacturing has grown remarkably since the early 1970s, maintaining real growth rates of value added in excess of 12 percent a year. The best description of the changing structure of firms by sector, size, and ownership is provided by Hill (1990a Hill ( , 1990b . At the same time, Indonesian credit markets have been highly segmented, and different kinds of Indonesian firms enjoy very different access to capital. The ability to obtain external funds in domestic credit markets differs between small and large firms, between Chinese and non-Chinese firms, between private and public enterprises, between firms affiliated with, and owned by, a group and independent firms, and between export-and domesticoriented firms. Moreover, the lack of exchange rate controls makes it possible for firms that have established good reputations and close connections in other countries to borrow money from offshore.
There are significant differences among Indonesian firms, which affect their access to foreign loans. Basically, the foreign option was open to conglomerates, to large Chinese firms with connections to the financial markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, to foreign firms, and to exporters with established overseas customer relationships.
Access to domestic credit also differs across firms. Although there were special credit schemes for small-scale industries, such as KIK and KMKP, they represented only a very small part of the total implicitly subsidized credit from state banks. The quantities of credit provided at explicitly subsidized rates amounted to only 0.14 percent of the total credit provided by state banks in 1981 and declined to 0.06 percent by 1988. Thus, although these special credit schemes were showcase programs during the period of financial-market controls, they provided an insignificant level of resources to the targeted sector. Indeed, the bulk of state bank credit extended before the 1983 reforms went to the larger firms, which had political connections, influence, and special channels to the banks because of their longtime relationships, coupled with their ability to provide assets as collateral. Relatively new (young), independent firms, which had not built up their reputation and political connections, faced highly constrained access to the pool of low-cost credit.
In summary, there are profound differences among Indonesian firms in their access to credit markets. The differences are not only in the duration and interest rates of loans, but also in their currency denomination. Some firms (in particular, small, non-Chinese, independent, and young firms) are likely also to face severe information problems and lack of political connections. This limits their ability to obtain funds from the formal credit markets (domestic or foreign) and forces them either to rely on internal finance or to raise funds from the informal markets. Other firms, in particular those belonging to conglomerates, as well as large Chinese firms, joint ventures with foreigners, and public enterprises, are likely to have privileged access to the domestic credit market combined with the ability to borrow offshore. The differential access to, and cost of, external finance for different categories of firms is likely to have a profound effect on their investment choices.
III. ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENTS: EVIDENCE FROM A PANEL OF INDONESIAN MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS, I98I-88
In this section we focus on the evolution of the real and financial characteristics of a panel of Indonesian manufacturing establishments during 1981-88. We then look at how banking reforms affected the distribution of debt across different types of firms in the sample.
The Data and Summary Statistics
The panel of manufacturing establishments has been constructed by taking advantage of information from two main sources. The first source is the annual sur-vey of manufacturing establishments, conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics since 1975. The survey includes financial data available only after 1981. The second source is the Census of Manufacturing Industry conducted in 1986, which contains a measure of the replacement value of the capital stock and a breakdown of sales between the export and domestic markets, data that are not available from the annual surveys.
After checking for the consistency of the data throughout the whole sample period, deleting establishments that have nonpositive capital stock or value added, and omitting outliers, we ended up with a sample of 2,970 establishments that have at least three sequential years with positive output and at least one year with positive investment. We base the analysis in this section on this sample. The appendix describes the selection of establishments and the methods used to construct the variables.
That the data are based on establishments presents a problem we have been unable to fully overcome. Most of the analysis of credit market segmentation applies to firms. When firms own or control multiple establishments, the unit for which debt and interest payments is reported is somewhat arbitrary. This certainly applies to the establishments that belong to conglomerate groups. We believe that most of the establishments that we identify as nonconglomerate are singleestablishment firms and, if so, there should be no confusion on this account. It is safe to assume that virtually all of the establishments we classify as "small" are in fact single-establishment firms-only 11 of the 777 in this class are members of conglomerate groups. However, it is possible that some are units of family enterprises that may also be engaged in nonmanufacturing activities. We have no way of controlling for this possibility.
Another feature to remember is that the sample is restricted to establishments that existed for at least four years and employed at least 20 persons. These selection criteria require that establishments that began production later than 1986 are omitted along with those that carried out no new investment, either for replacement or expansion. Therefore, these data are limited to relatively well-established firms that were able and willing to expand their plant and equipment during the period. The interesting question that cannot be addressed by these data, therefore, concerns the access to capital for new entities.
The key summary statistics for the sample of 2,970 establishments are given in tables 3, 4, and 5. These tables present the data for the entire sample as well as for subsamples chosen according to the firm's size, organizational form (conglomerate or nonconglomerate), and market orientation (exporting or nonexporting).2 The subsamples related to size were obtained by classifying firms into three categories according to the number of workers. We classify an establishment as small if the number of workers during the first year of observation was 20 to 99, medium-size if Size and Period, Indonesia, 1981-84 and 1985-88 (ratio) Form, Firm Size, and Period, Indonesia, 1981-84 and 1985-88 (ratio) We classify an establishment as small if the number of workers during the first year of observation was 20 to 99, medium-size if the number of workers was 100 to 500, and large if the number of workers was greater than 500.
a. Capital stock includes land, buildings, machinery, equipment, and other items, at replacement value. b. Gross of tax and depreciation. c. Not including trade credit. Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data. See appendix for details. Firm Size, and Period, Indonesia, 1981-84 and 1985-88 (ratio) Note: We classify an establishment as small if the number of workers during the first year of observation was 20 to 99, medium-size if the number of workers was 100 to 500, and large if the number of workers was greater than 500. "Exporting" refers to establishments that produce for export markets.
a. Capital stock includes land, buildings, machinery, equipment, and other items, at replacement value. b. Gross of tax and depreciation. c. Not including trade credit. Source: Authors' calculations based on survey data. See appendix for details. the number of workers was 100 to 500, and large if the number of workers was greater than 500.3 The establishments were also classified into conglomerate and nonconglomerate categories: establishments that belong to a group of firms engaged in different types of activities are classified as conglomerates. The third categorization is whether the establishment directly exported any of its output in 1985. To see the effect of the 1983 financial liberalization on the behavior of individual establishments, the sample period was also divided into two subperiods: pre-and postliberalization (1981-84 and 1985-88, respectively) . The year 1984 was chosen as a cutoff to allow for the 1983 liberalization to take effect. To normalize variables for the scale of establishment, we have chosen to show investment and various financial flows as ratios in relation to the replacement value of the capital stock. In the tables that follow, we report average values of various ratios for different subgroups of establishments and subperiods of time. The ratios of interest include the ratio of gross investment to capital stock, which reflects expenditures for both replacement and expansion; the ratio of gross operating surplus before interest payments in relation to capital, which reflects the total returns to capital independent of financial structure; the ratio of gross operating surplus net of interest payments to own equity (measured as the value of capital stock minus debt), which reflects the profitability of equity holdings; the ratio of debt to capital, which captures the degree of leverage; and the ratio of value added to capital, which is a measure of capital intensity. We also show the ratio of total interest payments to total debt (excluding trade debt) as a measure of the average cost of borrowed funds for each type of establishment. The variations in this last ratio should reflect, in part, differential access to types of external finance.
The manufacturing sector in Indonesia was deeply affected by the 1983 deregulation along with the other structural reforms that were gradually implemented afterward. The abolition of credit ceilings, the curtailment of liquidity credits, and the elimination of most controls on interest rates had effects that differed systematically among establishments, depending on their specific characteristics as shown in tables 3,4, and 5.
It is impossible to disentangle completely the effects of financial reforms from those of other factors that were influencing economic incentives and resource allocation in Indonesia during this period. But the pattern of changes is consistent with theoretical predictions of the consequences of financial reforms, where these judgments are based on changes in the average values of various ratios in the preand postreform periods. Table 3 shows that the cost of borrowing (interest payments over the stock of debt) rose on average by almost 22 percent, from 16.9 percent to 20.6 percent. At the same time, value added per unit of capital rose by more than 40 percent, and the investment rate increased by more than 25 percent. The profitability of investment (the ratio of operating surplus before interest pay-3. Only a few establishments reduced or increased their number of workers sufficiently during the sample period to move the establishment to a different size category. Therefore we decided to use the firstyear number of workers for categorization. ments to capital stock) increased substantially, from gross returns of approximately 29 percent to 43 percent, which, of course, mirrored the marked increase in value added per unit of capital. Despite the higher interest rates, the degree of financial leverage in the industrial sector also increased. And the increases in profitability in relation to the increases in interest rates caused returns to equity (the ratio of operating surplus net of interest payments to capital stock minus debt) to rise even further, from gross levels of 42 percent to gross levels of 76 percent.
These rates of return appear implausibly high. They are obviously biased upward significantly by several factors. First, taxes and depreciation are not subtracted from the numerator. Second, the (substantial) value of working capital (inventories, accounts receivable, and holdings of financial assets) are not included in the denominator. However, our conclusions about the direction of change over time of rates of return, or about their relative values across different types of firms, are unlikely to be affected. Furthermore, it was clear from interviews conducted by Harris in 1988 that Indonesian manufacturing firms expect high rates of return. Entrepreneurs stated that they consider only investments with payback periods of two to two-and-a-half years.
For this constellation of outcomes to coexist in the aggregate, several different causal mechanisms may be operative. Increases in industrial profitability through exchange rate adjustments and relaxation of costly regulations and licensing systems can account for some of these changes. A higher cost of capital should lead to lower capital intensity and a higher marginal return to capital through factor substitution. In fact, there is about an 8 percent increase in the wage bill per unit of capital between the pre-and postliberalization periods, reflecting a similar increase in the use of efficiency units of labor. However, the increasing levels of investment and returns to equity associated with increased leverage are not consistent with an increase in the real interest rate in the context of a fully equilibrated capital market. These observations are consistent with results predicted when interest rate controls and administrative allocations are relaxed in a repressed system (Fry 1988, chap. 12-17) . In those models, higher interest rates cause the volume of intermediated savings to increase, and the switch from administrative to market-based allocation increases the marginal efficiency of investment. Less productive establishments that had access to the "cheap" credit previously through administrative connections relinquish their claims to resources because of cost. In addition, there are a substantial number of liquidity-constrained entrepreneurs, who would potentially use the funds profitably and who are willing and eager to expand their investment once they gain access to credit, despite its higher cost.
According to table 3, the financial reforms appear to have had the greatest relative impact on small establishments. 4 Although the interest rates faced by 4. Establishments we describe as "small" are classified as "medium" in the official Indonesian statistical system. In the official system the term "small" is reserved for enterprises with more than S and fewer than 20 employees. "Household" or "cottage" enterprises are the terms used to define the smallest units. The definition we use for "small"-a firm with 20 to 99 employees-conforms to standard international usage. small firms were always higher than for larger firms, they increased relatively much more. Yet, small firms, facing the highest interest rates, experienced the greatest relative increases in their rate of investment, their leverage ratio (the ratio of stock of debt to stock of capital), and the productivity of their capital (value added and gross profit per unit of capital, both of which doubled). As a result, the returns to their own equity increased dramatically, tripling from 26 to 78 percent.
Medium-size establishments, which were already the most highly leveraged and most profitable, experienced a small increase in interest rates and actually decreased their levels of leverage. At the same time, the large firms, which had enjoyed significantly lower interest rates, faced a 40 percent increase in interest rates, to levels comparable to those faced by medium-size firms. These large firms also dramatically improved their profitability and productivity and increased their degree of leverage, with resulting large increases in returns to equity.
As one would expect, given the institutional structure of Indonesian manufacturing, conditions of access to credit vary considerably across the size classes, but these data suggest a considerable diminution of the variation among firms categorized by size. Although the interest rates were highest for small establishments and lowest for large establishments both before and after liberalization, the proportional spread between these rates decreased slightly after the reforms, and differences between medium-size and large establishments virtually disappeared. Rates of profitability and productivity converged relatively, as did the leverage ratios. The small establishments continued to have the lowest levels of leverage and returns to equity throughout the entire period, but the differences narrowed after the reforms. At the same time, the rate of investment increased for all types of establishments, but most for the small ones, and there was a degree of convergence in these measures as well. 5 This picture is not inconsistent with one of less-well-connected small establishments benefiting from increased access to credit after reforms, albeit at higher interest rates. Also, the corresponding increases in cash flow, particularly for small firms, have substantially increased the capacity of firms to expand investment through self-financing, thereby making them less dependent on credit in the future.
If the sample is divided further between establishments that belong to a conglomerate and those that do not, more striking results appear. In table 4 the pattern is clear. For nearly every size category of establishment in each period, the conglomerate members consistently face lower interest rates, demonstrate higher returns to total assets and productivity of capital, have higher leverage ratios, and therefore show sharply higher returns to equity. They also sustain higher rates of investment.
5. Virtually all of the small establishments are in fact firms-the unit of analysis that would be most appropriate in considering questions of access to the credit system.
As emphasized in Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) , one way to mitigate informational problems is to belong to a business group, such as the Keiretsu in Japan, particularly if the group owns or has special ties with a bank. Belonging to such a group will tend to reduce the wedge between the costs of internal and external finance. As a consequence, large establishments that are part of conglomerates tend to have much higher ratios of debt to equity and of debt to capital than do unaffiliated large establishments. Several studies of the Indonesian Economy (Nasution 1983 (Nasution , 1986 Ramli 1991) have indeed found that the low interest rates and generous credit policies before 1983 caused Indonesian companies in general to choose very high debt-equity ratios. Table 4 shows that this is particularly true for all medium-size establishments and for large ones belonging to conglomerates.
The previous arguments that we made on the basis of variations only by size of establishment continue to hold, and the conclusions about the disproportionate gains of small firms are strengthened. Looking at the patterns within organizational forms, it is clear that small firms grew the fastest and increased leverage and raised productivity and profitability the most, despite facing the highest interest rates. In general, there is a marked tendency for convergence of activity and profitability within each group. The relative advantage of conglomerate members in terms of interest rates, leverage, and productivity remains roughly constant across size classes.
The pattern of high profitability and high leverage among medium-size establishments is similar, whether or not the establishments are members of con-glomerate groups. However, among large establishments, there are striking differences between conglomerate and nonconglomerate members. The conglomerates face lower interest rates, which we conjecture arise partly as a result of preferential access to priority credits in the prereform period and partly as a result of better access to cheaper offshore borrowing in the later period. They also have much higher rates of leverage and higher returns to assets. As a result, their return to equity is approximately three times as high as for the nonconglomerate establishments (1.47 compared with 0.47 in the recent period). As the figures indicate, the highest increases in postreform returns to capital were experienced by the small firms and large conglomerates, although all medium-size firms continued to enjoy the highest absolute returns. These differences among large establishments are also reflected in the differential rates of capital expansion through investment, which quite closely parallel the rates of profitability. These results are robust to the denominator chosen (capital or equity).
Before 1984, small establishments-those that we hypothesize were more likely to face financial constraints-indeed had leverage ratios much lower than did the medium-size and large firms. Small firms are characterized by relatively volatile earnings as well as a lack of access to formal credit markets and therefore are likely to pay higher interest rates in financially repressed economies. This hypothesis about the cost of borrowing is confirmed for the small firms in the sample: they have the highest average nominal cost of debt, defined as total interest payments divided by the stock of debt. The high cost of debt in the prereform period, 27 percent, compared with the average bank lending rate, which was less than 15 percent, is probably a sign of a high share of credit being obtained in the informal credit markets.
Not all of these changes in profitability of assets, borrowing, and investment rates can be attributed solely to the program of financial reform. As was pointed out in previous sections, much of the impetus for the entire package of reforms was to increase incentives for non-oil exports. These measures included exchange rate realignments, special allocations and interest rates for export credits, trade reforms, and changed administrative procedures for customs and ports. Therefore, it is useful to further categorize the establishments in our sample by export orientation and size. This is done in table 5, which reports the same measures that appeared in tables 3 and 4.
Among both small and large establishments there is a dramatic difference between exporters and nonexporters. In both periods, the exporters faced lower interest rates, achieved higher leverage ratios, and had much higher returns to assets. Returns to equity, which were already quite high, rose further after liberalization. By contrast, among medium-size establishments, the lower interest rates and higher leverage of exporters did not translate into higher returns to equity in the prereform period, because of the considerably lower returns to, and productivity of, capital in these units. However, there was a dramatic shift in the postreform period among these medium-size exporters, which became substantially more profitable than comparable, nonexporting medium-size units.
Clearly, the changes in fortunes of the exporting firms owed more to the trade and exchange rate reforms, which substantially increased the relative profitability of exporting, than to the financial reforms themselves. The aggregate data on non-oil export expansion confirms the response of Indonesian industry, which became particularly strong after 1988 (Parker 1991: 12-14; Hill 1990a Hill , 1990b . The small exporting establishments, which performed so well, seem to have continued to enjoy greater access to credit at lower rates than did nonexporters in both periods, although it can be argued that increased access to credit at higher rates probably allowed previously constrained small exporters to expand and increase their profitability.
Up to this point, the analysis on real and financial indicators for our panel of manufacturing establishments can be summarized as follows. For small establishments, the economic reform had a positive effect on their overall performance. Medium-size firms may have been adversely affected by the liberalization and their degree of leverage decreased. However, one must be cautious about this conclusion. Medium-size establishments were already highly leveraged and were enjoying large cash flows in the later period. It may also have been that entrepreneurs made rational decisions to reduce the risk of high leverage, although the evidence is incontrovertible that returns to equity were extremely high as a result of leverage. The interplay between the prudential behavior of banks and the demands for credit by highly profitable and rapidly expanding medium-size firms cannot be fully analyzed at this point. The investment data suggest that both small and large conglomerate establishments were able to increase their investment rates substantially. By contrast, medium-size establishments experienced only a small increase in their investment rate, despite their absolutely high rates of return. They also showed little improvement in their average capital productivity, whereas the other establishments nearly doubled theirs, albeit from much lower initial levels. Therefore, after liberalization the productivity levels among the various categories of establishments began to converge.6
The Distribution of Debt
Which establishments benefited and which suffered from the reallocation of credit following financial reform? Tables 6, 7 , and 8 provide data on establishments' shares of the stock of debt, new debt, value added, and the stock of domestic and foreign debt when establishments are grouped according to size, organizational form, and market orientation. These tables give a picture of how concentrated the credit distribution is in Indonesia and how it has changed since financial reforms were introduced.
Before examining the data regarding the relative shares of credit obtained by different types of establishments, an important fact must be kept in mind. The total volume of domestic credit channeled through the banking system rose in real terms by almost 20 percent a year (see table 1), but foreign borrowing increased even faster for the establishments in our sample. Foreign borrowing, which during 1981-84 accounted for 17.4 percent of the total debt of these firms, increased to 22.2 percent of the total in 1985-88. Thus changes in relative shares of credit must be interpreted in light of the rapidly expanding total.
The new-debt variable, measuring the additional flows of debt accumulated by these existing firms during each of the periods to finance expansion, should be a more sensitive measure of the changing pattern of credit allocation. At first glance, it is evident that small establishments receive a small share of total debt under any of these measures and that large ones receive a disproportionate share. However, in judging the degree to which credit is concentrated, it is most reasonable to compare debt shares with value added shares in each of the two periods.
Comparing columns 1 and 3 in table 6, in both periods credit shares reflect value-added shares quite closely, although both small and large establishments receive slightly lower shares of new debt in relation to value added than do medium-size ones. However, both total and new-credit shares increase for small establishments at the highest proportional rate. It is clear from column 4 that small establishments enjoyed the greatest increase in domestic credit, their domestic debt rising from 8.5 to 12.6 percent. At the same time, the large ones gained substantially by increased use of offshore borrowing.
In the earlier discussion of the interest rate effects of the reform, Indonesian domestic credit ceased being a "bargain,' and therefore it became advantageous for firms with access to offshore borrowing to take advantage of the substantially lower interest rates in other countries. We argued that conglomerate firms Table 7 . Firms' Share of Debt and Value Added by Organizational Form, Firm Size, and Period, Indonesia, 1981-84 and 1985-88 and firms with established exporting relations were far more likely to be able to borrow abroad. We now examine the process of credit allocation when establishments are disaggregated according to conglomerate and exporting status. Table 7 demonstrates the striking differences in the responses of conglomerate and nonconglomerate units. Because the number of small establishments associated with conglomerates is minuscule, all of the findings for small establishments in table 6 continue to hold. Medium-size and large nonconglomerate establishments experienced a decline in their shares of total debt and in value added, and medium-size firms experienced a decline in their share of new debt. However, both small and large nonconglomerate firms increased their share of domestic credit.
It is clear that firms in all size categories of conglomerates increased their share of value added, total debt, and new credit. However, medium-size firms had decreasing shares of domestic credit, and the entire expansion for total conglomerates was explained by their sharply increased share of the increasingly important foreign borrowing. Table 8 reveals a similar picture when the establishments are classified according to whether they exported. Major economic reforms after 1985 were intended to stimulate non-oil exports. The success of the reforms is reflected in the increase in the share of value added by firms that did some exporting, the share rising from 54.3 to 63.6 percent. This is consistent with analysis of the rapid rise Size, and Period, Indonesia, 1981-84 and 1985-88 of manufactured exports (see Parker 1991) , a process that has accelerated further after the end of the period for which we have data.
In the aggregate, exporters received increased shares of total and new credit, which arose from increasing shares of both domestic and foreign borrowing. These conclusions hold for every size category of exporting firms.
Looking at the nonexporters, both small and large establishments received increased shares of total, new, and domestic credit. The share of value added by small establishments in this category increased slightly, but the shares of both medium-size and large ones fell. The relative decline of all medium-size establishments in table 7 is dearly explained by the substantial declines experienced by medium-size units that did not export. In the previous section, it was shown that before deregulation those establishments were the most profitable and most leveraged. Afterward, however, their investment rates, profitability, and leverage ratios all declined in relation to other units. In table 8, it is evident that the share of value added and credit for nonexporting, medium-size establishments fell sharply according to any of the measures.
This analysis of credit allocation sheds more light on how financial reform appears to have had different effects on establishments with different characteristics. Small establishments, which previously lacked access to the financial system, benefited by improved access even at substantially higher interest rates. At the same time, the high cost of domestic credit encouraged firms with access to foreign financial markets to substitute cheaper, foreign credit. These were the firms that were unlikely to face informational asymmetries, namely, large conglomerates that owned banks and enjoyed direct relations with the offshore credit markets in Singapore and Hong Kong, and exporters with established overseas commercial relations. This diversion of demand for domestic credit by the well connected could have been a significant factor in allowing greater access to credit by less-well-connected establishments.
IV. AN ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTS OF FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION ON INVESTMENT
Is there econometric evidence that liberalization has succeeded in relaxing financial constraints faced by individual establishments? We investigate this issue by estimating a simple form of the investment function for the panel of individual establishments. The specification is based on the following characterization of the underlying behavioral relations.
Firms increase their capital stock through investment in response to expected profit. Desired investment can be financed in a number of ways; borrowing from credit markets and retention of cash flow (internal finance) are the two most important sources of funds for expanding existing firms. If capital markets are perfect, and abstracting from taxes, firms will be indifferent between various sources of funds. They will finance their investment at a constant marginal cost that will be closely related to the risk-free market interest rate, and they will invest until the latter is equated to the expected marginal return to investment. However, with a risk of bankruptcy, informational asymmetries, and contract enforceability problems, lenders may be willing to provide additional financing for investment only at increasing interest premiums. The premium charged will depend on the value of the firm's assets that can be used as collateral. We expect there to be a negative association between investment and the debt-to-capital ratio, because the divergence between the risk-free rate and the marginal cost of borrowing increases as the degree of leverage rises.
Moreover, if markets are segmented, so that some classes of firms have limited access to borrowing, some will be forced to rely on internally generated funds and may have to forego some desired investment because of financial constraints. In such cases, we expect levels of investment to be positively related to measures of cash flow. Cash flow is also likely to provide information about future profitability. However, if the information content of cash flow does not vary across firms or over time, differences in the size of its coefficient are likely to reflect the degree of tightness of financial constraints. In carrying out an empirical investigation of the importance of market segmentation and of the effects of financial reform, it is natural, therefore, to estimate investment as being determined by expected profitability (proxied by changes in output), the risk-free market rates of interest, the degree of financial leverage, and cash flow.
We also expect the coefficient on the degree of leverage to differ across firms and between periods. Because the coefficient reflects the premium above the safe rate that must be paid as the debt-to-capital ratio increases, it is likely that the coefficient will be larger for firms that are perceived as riskier and for which informational imperfections are more severe. Moreover, we expect that the premium will decrease after financial liberalization if banking intermediaries are more efficient than the curb markets in gathering information about borrowers and monitoring them. It is controversial whether this is indeed the case, and we hope our empirical results will shed some light on these issues.
We conduct our empirical analysis by estimating an unrestricted investment equation of the general accelerator type, to which we have added cash flow and the debt-to-capital ratio. In equation 1, Iit/Ki,-1 denotes the rate of investment, AYi,/Ki,-1 denotes the change in sales as a proportion of the capital stock, Si,/Ki,-1 denotes cash flow, and Di,-,IKi,-_ denotes the debt-to-capital ratio. Both K, 1 and Dt_ 1 denote stocks at the end of period t -1. The general specification for our regression equation is
and Xi is a time-invariant, firm-specific effect; -t is a common time effect; and ei, is the idiosyncratic component of the error term.
Equation 1 has been estimated in first differences to control for the firmspecific effects, using both ordinary least squares (OLS) and the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator. The GMM method provides consistent (and efficient) estimates when the regressors are endogenous, which is likely to be the case for our model (Arellano and Bond 1991) .7 Appropriately lagged values of the regressors are used as instruments (see the note to table 9). The effects of changes in the basic risk-free interest rate are captured, along with all other macro conditions that vary over time, in the same way for all firms, by yearspecific dummies that are included in all the specifications. The output term is meant to capture the expected change in demand for the firm's product. The equation has been estimated on an unbalanced panel of 523 establishments that have at least four years of complete data (including nonzero investment). Our goal is to assess whether access to external finance varies across firms and whether financial liberalization has succeeded in relaxing financial constraints. 8 To do this, we allow the coefficients on the regressors, in particular the ones on the financial variables, to differ across firms according to their size. The coefficients are also allowed to differ between the pre-and postliberalization periods.
The econometric results are summarized in table 9. Columns 1 and 3 contain the OLS estimates and columns 2 and 4 the GMM estimates that were obtained by allowing the effects of cash flow and debt to differ between small firms (employing fewer than 100 workers) and larger firms (employing 100 or more workers). 9 M, is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is small and 0 otherwise, so that, for instance, (St/K,-,)M, denotes the cash flow variable for small firms, and (S,/K,_1)(1 -M,) the one for larger firms. The overall picture provided by the OLS and the GMM estimates is quite similar. Comparing the two sets of results reveals that the coefficients estimated by OLS are generally smaller in absolute value and less precisely determined, as one would expect with measurement errors in the variables. Thus we focus on the GMM estimates. The GMM results in column 2 support the notion that investment behavior differs substantially across different categories of firms. Small firms appear to rely more on internal funds, as shown by the larger and significant cash flow coefficient, a result consistent with the view that small firms are liquidity-constrained.
The lack of access to credit and a large premium for external finance caused by asymmetric information appears to describe well the situation faced by small firms, whose coefficient of the debt-to-capital ratio is negative and significant. The cash flow coefficient for larger firms is small and insignificant, a strong indication that internal funds are less important for larger firms. Also the coeffi-7. The program DPD (dynamic panel data) has been used in the estimation (Arellano and Bond 1988) . 8. For evidence on the differential effect of cash flow in industrial countries, see Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) ; Devereux and Schiantarelli (1989); Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); and Blundell and others (1992) . See Tybout (1983) and Nabi (1989) for evidence of the importance of financial constraints as determinants of investment in Colombia and Pakistan, respectively. Finally, see Jaramillo, Schiantarelli, and Weiss (1993) for an analysis, using the Euler equation approach, of capital market imperfections and the effect of financial liberalization in Ecuador.
9. Firms are classified in only two size categories because a three-way split made the equation too complex, given the small number of observations in each cell. We cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient for the output term is the same across firms (or periods). 1985-84 to 1988-87) are also used as instruments. Instruments are used in their GMm(2,1) form. See Arellano and Bond (1988 cient of the debt-to-capital ratio is positive and significant for larger firms, contrary to what one would expect. This seems to suggest that, for larger firms, having a higher degree of leverage increases their ability to raise external funds. Having obtained debt in the past may act as a signal to financial intermediaries of firms' creditworthiness.
If we analyze further how the behavior of firms was affected by the financial deregulation in 1983, the story becomes even more interesting. Columns 3 and 4 in table 9 display the estimates of the effects of financial reform for different categories of firms. A dummy variable, Lt, that equals 1 after liberalization and 0 otherwise, is interacted with the financial variables and is used to assess the change in the cash flow coefficient and in the coefficient of the debt-to-capital ratio for small and large firms after liberalization, compared with the prereform period.
Before liberalization, the extremely large and positive cash flow coefficient for the small firms supports the hypothesis that small firms depended more heavily on internal funds to finance their investment. They also faced an increasing cost of external funds while their leverage was increasing, as suggested by the negative sign of the leverage coefficient. After liberalization, small firms relaxed their dependence on internal funds. The cash flow coefficient decreases significantly, from 0.558 to 0.290. Moreover the coefficient of the debt-to-capital ratio for small firms becomes very small in the period after liberalization. All the equations include year dummies to capture changes in the overall macro conditions. This minimizes the risk that changes in the slope coefficients may simply capture business cycle effects.' 0 For large firms the coefficient of cash flow is small and insignificant before liberalization and remains so afterward. The debt-to-capital coefficient is positive and does not change between the two periods for large establishments."' To better understand why the coefficient on the degree of leverage is positive for larger firms, we allow it to differ between larger firms that belong to a conglomerate group and those that do not (none of the small firms belongs to a conglomerate). We do not report the full results for lack of space. However, as we would expect in a world of asymmetric information, the leverage coefficient is negative and significant for larger individual firms. It is, however, positive and significant for larger establishments that are parts of conglomerates. It is unclear whether the degree of leverage reported for an individual subsidiary unit of a conglomerate should indeed increase the cost of borrowing, because assignment 10. We have also estimated the equations without year dummies, and the results are basically the same. 11. In a set of additional regressions, we have allowed for a more general dynamic specification of the equation by including the lagged dependent variable and one additional lag for the regressors. The fundamental conclusions reached in this article remain the same. We have also included future profits as an additional explanatory variable. In this specification the coefficient for cash flow decreases in size, as one would expect. However, it remains significant for small firms. Large firms are more responsive to future profits before liberalization, but the response of firms of all sizes becomes quite similar after financial reform. See Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar (1992) . of a particular liability to a specific unit is arbitrary and should be recognized as such by lenders. The coefficient on cash flow for large establishments does not depend on their conglomerate status.
V. CONCLUSION
What general conclusions can we draw at this stage about the effects of financial liberalization on Indonesian establishments? The overall impression one obtains from the analysis of the real and financial indicators for the establishments in our panel is that the economic reforms had a favorable effect on the performance of smaller establishments. On the financial side, liberalization has helped to reallocate domestic credit toward smaller establishments. To the extent that large units were successful in substituting the more expensive domestic credit with cheaper foreign credit, this helped to release some domestic credit to establishments lacking such access. Although nominal and real interest rates have risen to very high levels, real returns to capital assets remain high and have increased substantially, particularly for small and medium-size exporting establishments.
At the same time, the total volume of intermediated credit has expanded very rapidly following the reforms. For all groups, higher rates of financial leverage have given rise to extremely high returns to equity. Medium-size establishments, both conglomerate and nonconglomerate, have had the highest rates of retums to capital, financial leverage, and retums to equity. However, after liberalization these highly profitable units, which were already highly leveraged, reduced their leverage somewhat and did not experience as high an increase in their rate of investment as other establishments. However, one must be cautious in inferring causality, because the rate of cash flow remained high in relation to the rate of investment, and it is possible that many of these firms grew by forming new establishments in addition to expanding existing units.
The econometric results obtained from estimating investment equations also suggest that in the preliberalization period small units were facing capital market imperfections in the form of liquidity constraints or a schedule of rising costs for extemal funds, and that such financial constraints were relaxed after liberalization. The cash flow variable became less important, and the premium on external finance decreased substantially.
The results presented here should be treated with caution, and therefore a few caveats are in order. The nature of our sample did not allow us to examine the effect of financial reform on new start-ups and micro firms with fewer than 20 employees. Moreover, financial liberalization in Indonesia has been an ongoing process that accelerated further at the end of the 1980s, and, given the time dimension of our panel, we were not able to evaluate the effects of these most recent developments. More definite conclusions may be reached when investigators have access to data covering a longer period, after the implementation of reform measures introduced late in 1988.
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from our investigation is that financial reforms have had a significant, positive impact on firms' real and financial choices. The process of shifting from an administrative allocation of credit toward a market-based allocation has increased borrowing costs, particularly for smaller units, but, at the same time, has widened access to finance and decreased the degree of credit market segmentation. From the standpoint of investment and rates of profit, the net effect appears to have been positive.
APPENDIX. CONSTRUCTION OF THE DATA
The data were taken from the Annual Survey on Manufacturing Establishments, conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics since 1975. An additional data set, the 1986 Census of Manufacturing Establishments, proved useful because it contained data on capital stocks and exports. The number of establishments in the annual survey varied from 8,300 in 1975 to around 14,000 in 1988; 5,830 establishments in the 1986 census had complete data on capital stock.
We selected a sample of firms from the two sources as follows (see GultomSiregar 1992) . Before 1981, data on financial sources were not available. For this reason we used a sample period that ran from 1981 to 1988. The 1981-88 survey has data on 4,400 firms, with complete data for at least three sequential years of output, and the census data cover 5,430 firms. Merging the 1981-88 survey with the 1986 census left 3,192 firms with observations in both data sets. We then constructed capital stock estimates by backcasting and forecasting the capital stocks, using the capital stock from the 1986 data as a benchmark (see below for details). Deleting establishments that had estimated negative or zero capital stocks and extreme outliers, and keeping firms that had at least three years of positive output and at least one year with positive investment, left 2,970 establishments. This is the sample used for the descriptive statistics in section III (tables 3 to 8).
Many firms reported zero investment in many years. We were unable to determine whether reporting of zero investment was in fact a nonresponse or if it represented a real observation of very low investment. Because there are substantial econometric problems associated with estimating panel-based investment functions with observations of zero investment, the econometric analysis included only those observations in which the investment level was positive for at least four consecutive years. By following this practice, we were left with an unbalanced panel of 523 establishments, which is the sample used in section IV.
Although both samples are still subject to sample-selection bias, it is reassuring that the results reported in this article do not vary in any significant way from results reported earlier (Harris, Schiantarelli, and Siregar 1992) . Those results were based on a much more restricted sample of 249 firms that had eight consecutive years of positive investment. The robustness of results across our two samples gives reason to believe that the selection problems did not vitiate the results reported here. have fewer than 100 workers, medium-size establishments have 100 to 500 workers, and large establishments have more than 500 workers. Nonconglomerate refers to individual establishments. Export market refers to establishments whose products are exported directly. Domestic refers to establishments with 100 percent domestic equity; foreign or joint venture refers to establishments with any level of foreign-equity participation. Private refers to establishments with 100 percent private (nongovernmental) equity, and public enterprise refers to establishments with any level of central or regional government equity participation. the two samples. The degree to which the distribution of firms according to characteristics is unaffected by the unbalanced nature of the sample is remarkable and explains why our conclusions have been robust to alternative samples based on different selection criteria.
Capital Stock
We used 1986 prices to construct the variable for real capital stock. Fortunately, the 1986 census data provided the replacement value of capital stock. The data on annual investment purchases ware obtained from the annual survey, and a deflator for investment goods was used to convert the investment to a real level based on constant 1986 prices. We calculated the estimated capital stock using the perpetual inventory method. Our task was simplified because both sources have the data broken down into five components: land, building, machinery, vehicles, and other capital goods. The main advantage of this breakdown is that it enabled the assignment of different physical depreciation rates to each type of asset when constructing the capital stock estimates. The figure we used for total capital stock was the summation of those five variables net of assets sold during the period. For each type of asset, capital stock estimates were constructed by the perpetual inventory method, as follows: (A-1)
where i is the jth type of capital good, t is the time period, K is capital stock, I is investment, and IS is sales of existing capital goods. In choosing the real depreciation rates to be used (bi), we used information from an informal survey we conducted in 1990. On the basis of the information collected, we assumed that buildings depreciate by 0.033 annually, machinery by 0.10, vehicles by 0.20, and other equipment by 0.20. Land was not depreciated. Aggregating across the i types of capital goods, we obtained the establishment-specific capital stock measure Kt = EiKit.
This method of backcasting and forecasting the capital stock has one important weakness in that it is possible to estimate a negative capital stock value whenever the investment in a particular year is much larger than the previously estimated capital stock. We eliminated all establishments in which the capital stock estimate became negative in any year, because that is an impossibility and can arise only from data errors or gross deviation of estimated from actual physical depreciation rates.
To ensure that the estimate for capital stock was reasonable, we checked for outliers. We found that some establishments reported extremely low or high ratios of capital to value added. We believe that a ratio of less than 0.30 or more than 6.00 is a sign of misreported or mismeasured capital or value added. Therefore, we eliminated from the sample establishments with ratios of capital to value added of less than 0.30 or greater than 6.00.
Stock of Debt
To construct the debt variable, we used information collected in a special survey of 40 establishments carried out by Siregar in 1990. Most of the firms replied to the question concerning the flow of new debt for a certain year by providing, instead, the figure for the stock of debt outstanding, which was in fact easier to find in their balance sheet. By checking the ratios of debt to capital, interest to debt, interest to value added, and capital to value added, we concluded that it was indeed very likely that most of the establishments provided stock measures instead of flow measures of debt. Moreover, on the basis of these ratios it was possible to identify firms that provided data on flow of debt in any year. For these observations we converted flow data to stock of debt by cumulating the flows.
Finally, approximately 20 percent of the establishments did not provide the debt figures, although they almost always provided data on interest payments. Again from the special 1990 survey, some multiplant establishments did not have the debt figures in their bookkeeping, although they did have the interest payments, mainly because all loans were handled by the head office, with only the interest payments charged to the establishments. To obtain an estimate of the stock of debt for these establishments, we first had to decide which interest rate should be used to impute the level of debt. Considering that the average annual interest rates ranged from 5 percent for priority sectors to as high as 45 percent in the informal credit market, we decided to use the median interest rate of firms reporting interest rates within that range and to calculate it yearly for different sizes of firms. We then used this median rate to impute the debt levels for years in which the debt figure was missing but interest payments were reported. Finally, for the establishments having an interest-to-debt ratio outside the 0.050 to 0.450 range, we used interest payments and the median rates for that year in their size class to impute the debt figure. 
